propaganda, and everything else that might possibly conceivably in some imaginable universe affect the price of something worth buying or selling. The Terminal is absurdly customizable, helping traders track every last penny, piastre, and paisa of their portfolios. It even has restaurant reviews and shopping, both optimized for the 1% of the 1% looking to blow some of the wealth they have just extracted from their fellow man.
The Bloomberg Terminal, in short, is Big Data's elite commando strike force. There have always been quants, with their artisanal small-batch hand-crafted voodoo finance. But the Bloomberg Terminal makes financial necromancy accessible to mere mortals. Imagine yourself granted entry to this Olympus of data, striding here and there, seeing connections, making associations, tasting the ambrosia of insight. And now imagine, if you will, that you are being watched.
II. Hellhound on My Research Trail
It's not normally news when a crack addict stops coming around to his dealer. But when the addict is a partner at Goldman Sachs and the crack is the information flowing from his Bloomberg Terminal, that's news. A reporter thought to ring up 4 Goldman and inquire: is so-and-still with the firm? He hasn't logged in to Bloomberg lately. It was a nice bit of journalistic tradecraft, except for one detail: the reporter worked for Bloomberg News, and knew about the partner's terminal use because Bloomberg News employees had access to it. For years, they had been checking when persons of interest logged in, and what features they accessed. "We were told again 5 and again and again, find ways to use what's on the terminal to write stories." 6 From there, things went pear-shaped in a hurry for Bloomberg. Goldman's management called around to understand the extent of the snooping. The rest of the 7 press found out, and wrote about the snooping with the gleeful ferocity of an athlete who has just discovered the syringes in his archrival's locker. Regulators from 8 Treasury and the Federal Reserve asked pointed questions about whether their employees had been spied on, too. Bloomberg cut off its reporters' access to terminal 9 usage information, and then, when that failed to stanch the reputational bleeding, [Draft 3 commissioned a nominally "independent" review of its privacy and security standards. 10 Some have downplayed the privacy implications, pointing out that Bloomberg reporters could see only general information about users' activities, not specific searches and stocks. They have a point, given the steady drumbeat of genuinely 11 serious privacy breaches in the news. But even if in this particular case, Bloomberg's 12 reporters stopped short of the most dastardly deeds they were technologically capable of, we should not let their restraint blind us to the full extent of the dastardry Big Data makes possible.
We are accustomed to speaking about Big Data's privacy concerns in terms of the surveillance it enables of data subjects. Anyone high enough to take a ten-13 thousand-foot view can see over fences. Take a wide-angle shot, zoom and enhance, and you have a telephoto close-up. But consider now the user of the Bloomberg terminal, zipping from function to function, running down a hunch and preparing to make a killing. Perhaps he correlates historical chart data for energy-sector indices with news reports on international naval incidents in the Pacific Rim. He pulls patterns out of after-hours trading data, checking them against SEC filings and earnings calls. He has a theory, about what happens when certain shipbuilders report their quarterlies-two usually-coupled bond funds briefly diverge-and he stands ready to pocket some cash the next time it happens by exploiting this informational advantage with overwhelming financial force. Tell him that someone has been watching every keystroke, and you will see the blood drain from his face. Or for more a more sympathetic figure, go back to Bush's description of a memex user:
The owner of the memex, let us say, is interested in the origin and properties of the bow and arrow. Specifically he is studying why the short Turkish bow was apparently superior to the English long bow in the skirmishes of the Crusades. He has dozens of possibly pertinent books and articles in his memex. First he runs through an encyclopedia, finds an interesting but sketchy article, leaves it projected. Next, in a history, he finds another pertinent item, and ties the two together. Thus he goes, building a trail of many items. Occasionally he inserts a comment of his own, either linking it into the main trail or joining it by a side trail to a particular item. When it becomes evident that the elastic properties of available materials had a great deal to do with the bow, he branches off on a side trail which takes him through textbooks on elasticity and tables of physical constants. He inserts a page of longhand analysis of his own. Thus he builds a trail of his interest through the maze of materials available to him. 14 For "bow and arrow," substitute "genital herpes" or "radical politics." For the historian, substitute a lawyer on a major case or a journalist on the City Hall beat. Think about all the people who might find some use in seeing your research trails: opposing counsel, corrupt police chiefs, lovers, rivals, frenemies, talk radio demagogues, creepy bosses, trolls, self-righteous prudes, kooks and zealots of every stripe, and that one petty-minded neighbor with a lot of grudges and a little time to kill. The memex is-it is designed to be-an externalized record of its user's every thought. Using it is like plugging yourself into the most perfect brain scanner ever devised. If you care, even just the slightest bit, about your intellectual freedom, then you, I submit, are very interested in who has access to your memex and the memories it holds. Big Data puts the world at your fingertips-so with Big Data, your 
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NSA tells analysts to find targets by identifying people "searching the web for suspicious stuff." Search-query signature strikes cannot be far off. 17 Indeed, Big Data is recursive: it tends inevitably to convert its users into its subjects. How does Google map flu trends? Not by testing people for infection, but seeing who searches for information about flu. Every visitor to the Land of Data 18 leaves a little of herself behind. Every query is further grist for the mill. Even Vannevar Bush, writing in 1945, bless his prescient and naive heart, understood this much:
The historian, with a vast chronological account of a people, parallels it with a skip trail which stops only on the salient items, and can follow at any time contemporary trails which lead him all over civilization at a particular epoch. There is a new profession of trail blazers, those who find delight in the task of establishing useful trails through the enormous mass of the common record. The inheritance from the master becomes, not only his additions to the world's record, but for his disciples the entire scaffolding by which they were erected.
He might have added that we will all be trailblazers, that the greatest value of the memex-its permanent and globally shared record of every user's research trails-is precisely its greatest curse. We are the spiders spinning Big Data's web of knowledge, and we are also the flies trapped in it. He who works with data should look to it that 19 he himself does not become data. And when you gaze long into Big Data, Big Data also gazes into you. 20 See, e.g., XKEYSCORE 15 (NSA PowerPoint Presentation Feb. 25, 2008) 
III. Mutually Assured Privacy Destruction
There is another way of understanding the relationship between Big Data subjects and Big Data users. The fact that users also have privacy interests at stake complicates the project of protecting subject privacy. To understand the problem, it helps to understand something of the debate over how what to do about safeguarding those whose personal information has been hoovered up at terabyte scale.
For a time, it appeared that no restrictions on use might be necessary because there were no data subject privacy interests at stake. Deidentification was the watchword of the day: it was thought that some simple scrubbing-stripping a dataset of names, ranks, and serial numbers-would render these data driftnets dolphin-safe. And the database wranglers would have gotten away with it, too, if it hadn't been for those meddling computer scientists. Personal information always 21 contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in an IP address, and a very modest grade of data has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he may be reidentified from, unless there is a restriction in access to the database. Although there is a lively dispute about where to draw the balance between the needs of the many (as data subjects) and the needs of the many (as research beneficiaries), it is by now painfully clear that some such balance must be struck. 22 The next line of defense, implicit in the burgeoning discourse of Big Data boosterism, is that only incorruptible researchers who are pure of heart will be plowing through the piles of data in search of ponies. Epidemiologists are the poster children, perhaps because public health officials would never, ever jump to conclusions about poorly understood diseases sweeping through their communities. This ideal of a trusted elite priesthood of data analysts bears an uncanny similarity to National Rifle Association head Wayne LaPierre's invocation of "good guys with guns." When Big Data is outlawed, only outlaws will have Big Data. Actuaries and 23 supply chain optimizers, perhaps, come close to this technocratic ideal.
But Big Data today is probably better embodied by marketers and hedge-fund traders, two professions not known for their generous concern for human flourishing. It is hard to feel sanguine about the Big Swinging Dicks who brought us the 24 See Ohm, supra note 10 (summarizing reidentification literature). by the most honest of men, and it will find something in them to put him on the drone kill list. One might-as the Obama Administration asks-simply trust in the good faith and minimal competence of the Three Letter Agencies that brought us extraordinary rendition, COINTELPRO, and the Clipper Chip. Or, more realistically, one might question the wisdom of creating comprehensive fusion centers accessible to every vindictive cop with a score to settle. 27 Thus, since Big Data cannot be entirely defanged and its users cannot be entirely trusted, it becomes necessary to watch them at work. It seems like a natural enough response to the problem of the Panopticon. Subject privacy is at risk because Big Data users can hide in the shadows as they train their telescopes not on the stars but on their neighbors. And so we might say, turn the floodlights around: ensure that there are no dark corners from which to spy. We would demand audit trails-permanent, tamper-proof records of every query and computation.
But if we are serious about user privacy as well as about subject privacy, transparency is deeply problematic. The audit trails that are supposed to protect Big Data subjects from abuse are themselves a perfect vector for abusing Big Data users. 28 Indeed, they are doubly sensitive, because they are likely to contain sensitive information about both subjects and users. The one-way vision metaphor of the Panopticon, then, is double-edged. Think about glasses. A common intuition is that mirrorshades are creepy, because the wearer can see what he chooses without revealing where his interest lies. Everyone is up in arms about the Google Glass-holes who wear them into restrooms. But the all-seeing Eye is a window to the soul. The See, e.g., Letter from Dione J. Stearns, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, to
28
Ginger McCall (Sept. 25, 2012) (withholding information about Google's privacy assessments from release under the Freedom of Information Act). To be sure, Google requested that the "confidential and proprietary information" be withheld it was "competitively sensitive," but at a finer level of granularity, such a report would include precise and sensitive details of how Google employees use their access to its massive databases. See generally Yakowitz, Data Commons, supra note __, at 17-20 (describing agencies' use of personal privacy arguments to deny FOIA requests).
Segway for your face is also a camera pointed directly at your brain that syncs all its data to the cloud. The assumption Glass users are making, presumably, is that no one else will have access to their data, and so no one else will be pondering what they're pondering. But that's what Bloomberg Terminal users thought, too.
This leaves meta-oversight: watching the watchmen. Audit trails don't need to be public; access to them could be restricted to a small and specialized group of auditors. But this privacy epicycle introduces complications of its own. You have a security problem, so you audit your users. Now you have two security problems: you are committed to safeguarding and watching over not just your data, but your data about how your data is being used. Whoever looks through the logfiles will be able to gain remarkable insight into users' methods and madnesses. Yes, the auditors will be looking for suspicious access patterns, but they'll need to have access to the full, sensitive range of information. You wouldn't want an insider trading scandal in which an auditor piggybacked on an analyst's research, or a auditor who picks a favorite user and turns into a stalker. Your auditors, in other words, are also Big Data users, which means that they too will have to be audited. It's watchmen all the way down.
IV. Crowdsourcing and Power
This convergence between Big Data's two privacy problems brings home the degree to which the Big Data story is a story of centralized control. It is the accumulation of large repositories of data that makes comprehensive surveillance possible, on both sides. When data is lying about raw, in the wild, any forager can pluck some, but the risks are necessarily limited. When that same data has been harvested, processed, and warehoused, two things change. First, it becomes far more threatening to the subjects, precisely because the accumulation of details harmless in themselves can make patterns evident. And second, it becomes necessary, to restrict access to the data: not just anyone can be allowed to run queries against it with anonymous impunity.
That is, centralizing data disempowers both subjects and users. They are both now subject to the policies-or, perhaps, "whims"-of whatever entity controls the dataset. Data ownership is power, of a peculiarly feudal ilk. The data barons of Silicon Valley struggle to ensure that data about people comes to rest in their own servers. Whomsoever would work these vast tracts of data to harvest insight must do the data barons homage. By what feudal incidents does one become a data vassal? Socage, of course-payment in coin-but also data service-giving up yet more information about oneself. The synoptic view that Big Data affords is not, it turns out, something that will be widely shared. That, the barons will hoard for themselves.
Big Data doesn't just grow on trees; it isn't natural or inevitable. It describes a particular configuration of institutional relationships among data's subjects, users, and owners, one in which concatenation and concentration give a small set of actors disproportionate power to determine who knows what about whom. This is a form 29 of ideology: that there are invaluable insights available in datasets so large they can only be effectively managed by centralized repositories. This ideology of Big Data is explicitly used to justify overriding the privacy concerns of its subjects, and it has 30 the side effect of putting its users in a position where they are subject to the observation and control of the data barons. Not just privacy law, but intellectual property law, contract law, unauthorized access law, and many other bodies of decidedly non-neutral doctrine are used to create a world in which data is always collected and rarely distributed. This novus ordo datorum serves the interests of 31 autocrats, bureaucrats, and secret police; it appeals to data-addicted technologists and venture capitalists on the prowl for their next Internet-scale score. But-for all the insights that Big Data offers-we can question whether its arrangements are as good for the rest of us.
Perhaps there is another way. Consider a different possible ideal for managing our relationship to information. Call it Small Data, or Local Data, or Slow Data, or Sustainable Data, or perhaps Democratic Data-enough to go around, enough for everyone to have some. Not perhaps, a lot, but enough. Enough not to be beholden to anyone else, enough to participate meaningfully in society, enough that no one can take away your dignity. Democratic Data is not the opposite of Big Data: these yeoman dataholders will join together their datasets at times to serve the public good, but they will be ever mindful of the risk of data tyranny. Alexander Hamilton 32 would have loved Big Data, with its Enlightenment ambitions, brutally rational economics, and awe-inspiring centralized power. Democratic Data is more of a Thomas Jefferson kind of idea-civic, romantic, uplifting, a little contradictory, and faintly impractical. Perhaps this might mean giving up the Bloomberg Terminal, or dividing out its functions and sharing access to some of them more widely. But would we want to live in a world that sets these ideals aside, rather than seeking, however fitfully and imperfectly, to realize a Republic of Data, where all men and See Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 REV. , 1918 REV. -27 (2013 .
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See, e.g Yakowitz, Data Commons, supra note __, at 66 (calling use of personal data for public-30 benefiting research projects "he tax we pay to our public information reserves" and arguing that "if taken to the extreme, data privacy can make discourse anemic and shallow").
Subject privacy is, in large measure, a creature of tort law. Tort duties supposedly keep us safe 31 from GPS trackers and upskirt drones; tort law hangs like the sword of Damocles over Big Data controllers who guard their super-sized datasets with subpar security (even if it never actually seems to drop). But user privacy is almost entirely a creature of contract law. The boilerplate contracts that let users inside armor-plated data silos spell out what can, or less often can't, be done with the security-camera footage. If they sell your record of searches for panda gangbangs to the FSB, or your detailed map of flu trends and your interest in viral genetics to the FBI, they'll say you have only yourself to blame for clicking where it said "Click here to agree." 
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